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I. INTRODUCTION
In a July 23, 2012 Consent Decree,1 the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), acting through its Executive Committee and President
Mark Emmert, imposed unprecedented sanctions on Pennsylvania State
University (Penn State).2 This action apparently was taken in an effort to
* Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute and LL.M. in Sport Law for
Foreign Lawyers Program. I want to thank Aaron Hernandez, Marquette University Law School
Class of 2013, for his research assistance in connection with this article.
1. RODNEY A. ERICKSON & MARK A. EMMERT, BINDING CONSENT DECREE IMPOSED BY THE
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ACCEPTED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY (2013) [hereinafter CONSENT DECREE], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
100830988/NCAA-Penn-State-Consent-Decree.
2. Tony Hanson & Oren Libermann, NCAA Announces Unprecedented Sanctions Against Penn
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convincingly demonstrate presidential control of intercollegiate athletics
after recent widely reported scandals involving violations of NCAA
amateurism, academic integrity, and ethical conduct rules by persons
associated with high-profile intercollegiate football programs, including the
University of Southern California, the Ohio State University, the University
of North Carolina, and the University of Miami.3 Based solely on the
findings and conclusions of the July 12, 2012 “Freeh Report”4 and the June
22, 2012 criminal conviction of former Penn State assistant football coach
Gerald Sandusky of serial child sexual abuse, the NCAA coerced Penn State
into accepting draconian institutional sanctions, including a $60 million fine,
a four-year ban on any postseason football games, a significant reduction of
football scholarships over a four-year period, and vacation of 112 football
wins from 1998–2011.5 It also required Penn State to waive its rights “to a
determination of violations by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, any
appeal under NCAA rules, and any judicial process.”6
This unprecedented use of de facto “best interests” power to punish a
member university for individual criminal activity and institutional
misconduct which “ordinarily would not be actionable by the NCAA”7 and
which was unilaterally imposed outside of its customary rules enforcement
and disciplinary procedures violated Penn State’s contractual due process
rights and private association law as well as possibly federal antitrust law
and state common law restraint of trade laws.8 However, it is unlikely that
any of the provisions of the Consent Decree, which effectively punishes
thousands of innocent parties associated with Penn State, including its
football players, students, faculty, administrators, alumni, and fans, will be
judicially invalidated.9 Thus far, Penn State’s Board of Trustees and current
president have chosen to abide by its terms rather than contest any of them
State, CBS PHILLY (July 23, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2012/07/23/pennstate-community-awaits-ncaa-decision-on-football-program/.
3. See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
4. FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL
REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012) [hereinafter FREEH REPORT],
available at http://progress.psu.edu/assets/content/REPORT_FINAL_071212.pdf.
5. See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
6. CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 2.
7. Id. at 4.
8. See infra Part III–IV.
9. Id.
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in litigation. A Pennsylvania federal district court dismissed a parens patriae
antitrust suit filed by Governor Thomas Corbett on behalf of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s natural citizens, which sought to enjoin
the Consent Decree from being enforced.10 Another pending suit on behalf
of former Penn State football coach Joe Paterno’s estate and others asserts,
inter alia, that the NCAA breached its contractual obligations and exceeded
its authority, but none of the plaintiffs have authorization or standing to
assert any claims on behalf of Penn State for injunctive relief against
enforcement of the Consent Decree.11
Initially, I will describe the background and chronology of events giving
rise to the Penn State Consent Decree.12 Next, I will analyze Penn State’s
potential breach of contract and violation of law of private association
claims and consider the similar claims brought by the Paterno estate and
others.13 Thereafter, I will review Pennsylvania Governor Corbett’s
unsuccessful parens patriae federal antitrust suit and consider Penn State’s
potential antitrust claims.14
II. BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY
On November 4, 2011, Gerald Sandusky was indicted by a Pennsylvania
grand jury on charges of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated
indecent assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors, and
endangering the welfare of minors; several charged offenses occurred
between 1998 and 2002, when he was a Penn State football coach or
emeritus professor with unrestricted access to the university’s campus and
football facilities.15 Two days later, Penn State Senior Vice President of
Finance and Business Gary C. Shultz and Athletic Director Timothy M.
Curley were charged with failure to report child abuse and perjury; Curley
was also placed on administrative leave while Schultz stepped down.16 On
10. See infra Part IV.A.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See Mark Scolforo & Genaro C. Armas, Jerry Sandusky, Former Penn State Coach Accused
of Molesting Boys, Barred From Campus, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 6, 2011, 12:23 PM),
http://www.freep.com/article/20111106/NEWS07/111060648/Jerry-Sandusky-former-Penn-Statecoach-accused-molesting-boys-barred-from-campus.
16. Sara Ganim & Jan Murphy, Penn State Athletic Director Tim Curley, VP Gary Schultz Step
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November 9, Penn State’s Board of Trustees terminated the employment of
President Graham Spanier17 and Head Football Coach Joe Paterno.18
In a November 17, 2011 letter,19 Emmert notified Penn State interim
President Rodney Erickson that “the NCAA will examine Penn State’s
exercise of institutional control over its intercollegiate athletics program” in
light of the November 5 grand jury indictment of Sandusky for serial child
sexual abuse occurring in the university’s athletic facilities and allegations
that university officials failed to take proper action despite their knowledge
of this behavior.20 “[T]o prepare for potential inquiry” regarding whether the
university violated any of several enumerated NCAA principles and rules
regarding its duty to monitor and control its intercollegiate athletics program
as well as whether there was any unethical or dishonest conduct by
university employees in violation of NCAA rules (specifically, violation of
character, integrity, civility, honesty, and sportsmanship obligations, or a
failure to demonstrate positive moral values as teachers), Emmert requested
that Penn State provide information regarding its policies and procedures to
detect, prevent, and respond to sexual abuse of children.21 Although this
letter provided notice that the NCAA might seek to hold Penn State
institutionally liable for rule violations by its administrators and coaches and
expressly stated, “universities are often held accountable in our infractions

Down
in
Wake
of
Jerry
Sandusky
Scandal,
PENNLIVE
(Nov.
7,
2011),
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/11/penn_states_curley_schultz_are.html. On July
31, 2013, they were ordered to stand trial on these charges. Allison Steele, Former Penn State
Officials to Stand Trial, Judge Rules, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 31, 2013, 9:01 AM),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2013/07/31/3-ex-penn-state-officials-willstand-trial.html.
17. Mark Viera, Paterno Is Finished at Penn State, and President Is Out, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/sports/ncaafootball/-joe-paterno-and-graham-spanierout-at-penn-state.html. Spanier was subsequently charged with perjury, conspiracy, and endangering
the welfare of children and was ordered to be tried on these charges. See Mike McQueary Takes
Witness
Stand,
ESPN
(July
29,
2013,
6:53
PM),
http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/story/_/id/9518784/mike-mcqueary-witness-stand-joe-paterno-said-penn-state-erred; Steele,
supra note 16.
18. Viera, supra note 17. Paterno was not criminally charged prior to his January 22, 2012
death. See Jack Carey, Penn State Coaching Legend Joe Paterno Dies at 85, USA TODAY (Jan. 23,
2012, 3:01 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/story/2012-01-21/formerpenn-state-coach-joe-paterno-dead/52737230/1.
19. Letter from Mark A. Emmert, President, NCAA, to Rodney Erickson, President, Pa. State
Univ. (Nov. 17, 2011) at 1.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2–3.
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process for failure to meet them,”22 it did not indicate that any disciplinary
action against the university would be taken outside of this customary
process.
In response, Erickson informed Emmert that Penn State planned to
conduct its own investigation and requested that the NCAA defer taking any
action until it was completed.23 Emmert agreed to do so based on Erickson’s
agreement to share Penn State findings with the NCAA.24
On November 21, 2011, Penn State’s Board of Trustees commissioned
the law firm of Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP to investigate the alleged
failure of university personnel to report and respond appropriately to the
sexual abuse of children by Sandusky as well as possible occurrences of
abuse on Penn State’s campus or under the auspices of its programs for
youths.25 It was also asked to provide recommendations to better enable
Penn State to prevent and more effectively respond to future incidents of
such abuse.26
On June 22, 2012, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Sandusky of forty-five
counts of the criminal charges against him.27 Sandusky was found guilty of
sexually abusing ten boys; some of these crimes occurred on the Penn State
campus.28 He was sentenced to 30–60 years in prison, which is effectively a
lifetime sentence given that he is 69-years-old.29
The July 12 Freeh Report found a “total and consistent disregard by the
most senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s
22. Id. at 1.
23. Don Van Natta Jr., On Death’s Door: Inside the Negotiations that Brought Penn State
Football to the Brink of Extinction, ESPN (Aug. 4, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/
id/8228641/inside-secret-negotiations-brought-penn-state-football-brink-extinction.
24. Id.
25. FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.
26. Id.
27. Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/sports/ncaafootball/jerry-sandusky-convicted-of-sexuallyabusing-boys.html. In post-conviction media interviews, Sandusky continues to maintain his
innocence. See Genaro C. Armas & Mark Scolforo, Sandusky Speaks Again, Maintains Innocence,
AP (Mar. 25, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/sandusky-interview-air-nbcs-today-show
(discussing Sandusky’s interview on NBC’s Today show). Acknowledging that his touching of the
boys may have “tested boundaries,” he denies having any inappropriate contact that harmed or
violated them and is appealing his conviction. Id.
28. Drape, supra note 27.
29. Tim Rohan, Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 Years for Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/sports/ncaafootball/penn-state-sandusky-is-sentenced-in-sexabuse-case.html.
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child victims.”30 It found that, despite knowledge of Sandusky’s sexual
abuse of children in university athletics facilities, Sandusky was given
continued access to Penn State facilities and affiliation with its football
program and was not prohibited from bringing children on campus.31 The
report concluded that “to avoid the consequences of bad publicity, the most
powerful leaders at the University—Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley—
repeatedly concealed critical facts relating to Sandusky’s child abuse from
the authorities, the University’s Board of Trustees, the Penn State
community, and the public at large.”32 Based on its conclusion that there
was a “lack of centralized control” over Penn State’s athletic department33
and “[f]or the past several decades, the University’s Athletic Department
was permitted to become a closed community,”34 the report recommended
that Penn State take numerous steps to “ensure a sustained integration of the
Intercollegiate Athletics program into the broader Penn State community” as
well as to improve its governance and to protect children in its facilities and
programs.35
Almost immediately after issuance of the Freeh Report, Emmert
informed Penn State’s president that a majority of the eighteen university
presidents on NCAA’s Division I Board of Directors (which historically has
not had any role in rules enforcement) wanted to unilaterally impose a fouryear ban on its football program as institutional punishment for the
foregoing misconduct of university personnel.36 This is a sanction the
Committee on Infractions, which is empowered to identify NCAA rules
violations and determine appropriate disciplinary sanctions, had no explicit
authority to impose sanctions on Penn State because none of the university’s
athletic programs had been found guilty of a major violation of NCAA rules
within the preceding five-year period.37 Nevertheless, its imposition was
30. FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at 131.
34. Id. at 139.
35. Id. at 129–44.
36. Van Natta, supra note 23.
37. Id. NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2.3.2 permits the “death penalty,” which prohibits an institution from
participating in an intercollegiate sport for a designated period of time, to be imposed only on
“repeat violators” (i.e., institutions found guilty of a “major violation” within the past five years).
NCAA ACADEMIC & MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §
19.5.2.3.1–.2 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. A “major violation” is defined as a violation other than
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threatened unless Penn State accepted the draconian terms of a “negotiated”
consent decree and prevented them from being leaked to the media.38 Gene
Marsh, an attorney hired by Penn State to negotiate NCAA sanctions and a
former chair of the NCAA Committee on Infractions, characterized this
threat as “the NCAA equivalent of a cram-down.”39 He also realized it
would be futile to suggest that Penn State’s institutional liability and
sanctions be determined through the NCAA’s traditional rules-enforcement
process because “[t]heir minds were made up.”40 In order to avoid a
potential multi-year ban that would have prohibited the university’s football
team from playing any games, Penn State’s president was effectively
coerced under severe duress into accepting the NCAA’s unilaterally
imposed, harsh sanctions without informing and obtaining approval from the
entire university Board of Trustees.41
The July 23 Consent Decree requires Penn State to accept the findings
of the Freeh Report, meaning “traditional investigative and administrative
proceedings would be duplicative and unnecessary”; to acknowledge that the
report’s findings establish the university’s violation of the NCAA principles
and rules referenced in Emmert’s November 17, 2011 letter; and to waive its
rights “to a determination of violations by the NCAA Committee on
Infractions, any appeal under NCAA rules, and any judicial process.”42 It
imposes the following “punitive” sanctions on Penn State: a $60 million
one “that is isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal
recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not include any significant recruiting
inducement or extra benefit.” Id. § 19.02.2.1–.2. This disciplinary sanction has been imposed only
five times, generally in extreme cases in which an institution has committed intentional, severe, and
repeated major violations demonstrating clear disregard for NCAA rules: University of Kentucky
(no men’s basketball during 1952–1953 season); University of Southwestern Louisiana (no men’s
basketball during 1973–1974 and 1974–1975 seasons); Southern Methodist University (no football
during 1987–1988 season); Morehouse College (no men’s soccer during 2003–2004, 2004–2005,
and 2005–2006 seasons); and MacMurray College (no men’s tennis during 2005–2006 and 2006–
2007 seasons). Zac Wassink, Top Five Harshest NCAA Sanctions Ever, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 23,
2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ac-6202256.
38. Van Natta, supra note 23.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. President Erickson informed only Karen Peetz, the chair of the Board of Trustees, and
members of the Board’s Executive Committee in order to avoid a potential media leak of the consent
decree’s terms prior to its execution. Id.; see also Don Van Natta Jr., Penn State Faced 4-Year
Death Penalty, ESPN (July 26, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8199905/penn-statenittany-lions-rodney-erickson-said-school-faced-4-year-death-penalty.
42. CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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fine, “equivalent to the approximate average” of the annual gross revenues
generated by its football program; a four-year ban on any postseason football
games; a four-year reduction of football scholarships from the allowable
annual maximum of twenty-five to a limit of fifteen with an overall
maximum of sixty-five during this period; vacation of all 112 football wins
from 1998–2011; and five years of probation.43 It also includes a “corrective
component” requiring Penn State to adopt and implement all of the Freeh
Report’s recommendations regarding university governance, administration
of the university’s intercollegiate athletics program, and the protection of
children, as well as to enter into an “Athletics Integrity Agreement” and to
appoint an independent “Athletics Integrity Monitor.”44
During the July 23 press conference announcing the disciplinary
sanctions imposed on Penn State, Dr. Edward J. Ray, the chair of the NCAA
Executive Committee and president of Oregon State University, stated that
the “historically unprecedented actions by the NCAA today are warranted by
the conspiracy of silence that was maintained at the highest levels of the
43. Id. at 5–6; Van Natta, supra note 23. In addition to the NCAA sanctions, the Big Ten
Conference disciplined Penn State by rendering its football team ineligible to play in the Big Ten’s
conference championship game and requiring the university to forfeit its $13 million share of
conference football bowl revenues during its four-year bowl ban. Colleen Kane, Big Ten Hands
Penn State 4-Year Ban from Conference Title Game, CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2012),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-23/sports/ct-spt-0724-penn-state-big-ten-20120724_1_purdue-and-wisconsin-bowl-revenue-commissioner-jim-delany. From November 2011
to March 2013, Penn State has incurred an estimated $46 million in NCAA and Big Ten financial
penalties, legal and consulting fees, and lost sponsorship, advertising, and licensing revenues as a
result of the Sandusky child-sexual-abuse scandal. Michael McCarthy, Sandusky Sex-Abuse Scandal
Has
Cost
Penn
State
$46
Million,
ADVERTISING AGE
(Mar.
25,
2013),
http://adage.com/article/news/cost-penn-state-scandal-46-million/240488/.
Penn State’s brand,
which was ranked in the top five most trusted brands in June 2011, was ranked last among 104
NCAA universities measured nationally in January 2012, but it rebounded to number sixty-three in
March 2013. Id. Penn State athletics-department revenues declined by almost $7.9 million during
the 2011–2012 fiscal year, but, ironically, donor contributions to its football program nearly
quintupled from $2.1 million in 2010–2011 to $9.7 million in 2011–2012. Steve Berkowitz & Jodi
Upton, Penn St. Athletics Revenue Fell by $7.9 Million in 2012, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:56
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2013/04/08/penn-state-athletics-finances-2012-sandusky
/2064641/. In the past two years Penn State’s merchandising royalties declined almost $1 million to
$3.1 million from their July 1, 2010-June 30, 2011 peak of almost $4 million, which was prior to the
Sandusky child abuse scandal. Allison Steele, Penn State Caps, Other Items Continue Sales Slump,
Phil. Inquirer (Aug. 23, 2013) http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-23/news/41437681_1_billieve-lisapowers-penn-state.
44. CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 6–8; see also FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 129–44.
Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was subsequently appointed as the Athletics Integrity Monitor.
Van Natta, supra note 23.
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university in reckless and callous disregard for the children.”45 He
explained: “[T]hese are extraordinary circumstances.
The [NCAA]
Executive Committee has the authority to act on behalf of the entire
Association in extraordinary circumstances, and we’ve chosen to exercise
that authority.”46 Noting that the chancellors and presidents of both the
Executive Committee and Division I Board of Directors unanimously
supported these sanctions, Ray stated: “We have to reassert our
responsibilities and charge to oversee intercollegiate athletics. So the first
question you asked is does this send a message? The message is the
Presidents and the Chancellors are in charge.”47
President Emmert stated, “[t]his was and is action by the Executive
Committee exercising their [sic] authority, working with me to correct what
was seen as a horrifically egregious situation in intercollegiate athletics.”48
He cautioned: “[O]ne should not conclude that this was an abridged
enforcement process. It was completely different than an enforcement
process.”49 He acknowledged that the Executive Committee unilaterally
imposed the sanctions on Penn State without any negotiation.50

45. Edward J. Ray, Exec. Comm. Chair, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Press Conference (July
23, 2012) (transcripts available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources
/Latest+News/2012/July/21207236 and http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resour
ces/latest+news/2012/july/press+conference+q+and+a) [hereinafter ESPN Press Conference I].
46. Id. An NCAA online publication subsequently cited NCAA Bylaw 4.1.2(e), which states
that the Executive Committee is authorized to “[a]ct on behalf of the Association by adopting and
implementing policies to resolve core issues and other Association-wide matters,” as the basis of
authority. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 4.1.2(e); see also NCAA Authority to Act, NCAA (July
23, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/July/
21207233. Although Ray stated this was not an unprecedented exercise of this authority, which has
been used in the past when a situation “was so extraordinary” it required action in individual
instances, it does not appear the Executive Committee used this power to impose disciplinary
sanctions for NCAA rules violations. See ESPN Press Conference I, supra note 45.
47. ESPN Press Conference I, supra note 45.
48. Mark Emmert, President, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., Press Conference (July 23, 2012)
(transcript available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/
2012/july/press+conference+q+and+a) [hereinafter ESPN Press Conference II].
49. Id.
50. Id.
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III. BREACH OF CONTRACT AND VIOLATION OF LAW OF PRIVATE
ASSOCIATION CLAIMS
A. Penn State’s Potential Claims
It was appropriate for the Executive Committee to use its broad,
undefined authority under NCAA Bylaws section 4.1.2(e) to require Penn
State to immediately take corrective action to prevent future harm to
children,51
including
implementation
of
the
Freeh
Report’s
recommendations, entering into an Athletics Integrity Agreement, and the
appointment of an independent Athletics Integrity Monitor.52 On the other
hand, there were no then-existing “extraordinary circumstances” that
justified its punishment of Penn State for misconduct that does not explicitly
violate NCAA rules, punishment that was unilaterally imposed without the
procedural safeguards of the NCAA’s traditional rules-enforcement
process.53 At the time Penn State was coerced into agreeing to the terms of
the consent decree, Sandusky had been convicted and imprisoned for his
crimes,54 and Penn State officials who did not appropriately respond to his
serial sexual abuse of children had been removed from their positions for
several months.55 Although this was an unprecedented, horrific situation, it
was very unlikely to be repeated (especially at Penn State), and, according to
Emmert, the “Freeh Report is the product of an amazing . . . unprecedented
degree of openness for any University that [he had] ever seen.”56 Thus, this
unprecedented use of de facto “best interests” power to punish a member
university violated Penn State’s contractual due process rights and private
association law.
The “basic purpose” of the NCAA, a private association of more than
1000 member colleges and universities,57 “is to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of
51. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 4.1.2(e).
52. CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 6–8.
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
54. See Drape, supra note 27.
55. See Van Natta, supra note 23 (“Paterno, Spanier, Curley and Schultz were no longer
affiliated with the university,”).
56. ESPN Press Conference II, supra note 48.
57. See
About
the
NCAA,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
ncaa/about+the+ncaa (last updated Aug. 13, 2012).
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demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”58
NCAA member institutions are required to conduct their intercollegiate
athletics programs “in a manner designed to protect and enhance the
physical and educational well-being of student-athletes”59 and have the
responsibility “to protect the health of and provide a safe environment for
each of its participating student-athletes.”60 Another important objective of
the NCAA is to “promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure
that individual student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly
from achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate
athletics.”61
Although the NCAA has broad power to govern intercollegiate athletics
in a manner that achieves these objectives and to discipline its member
institutions for rules violations,62 there are contractual and other legal limits
on its monolithic regulatory authority. Courts generally require a sports
governing body to comply with its own rules, provide fair notice of the
conduct that violates them, follow the basic requirements of due process in
its internal disciplinary proceedings, exercise its governing and disciplinary
authority in a rational and consistent manner without any malice or bad faith,
and comply with applicable laws.63 The NCAA is not subject to the
requirements of the United States Constitution because it is not a “state
actor,”64 but it must comply with federal antitrust laws.65 Regarding the
scope of judicial review of NCAA disciplinary sanctions, a California court
explained that “[t]he only function which the courts may perform is to
determine whether the association has acted within its powers in good faith,
in accordance with its laws and the law of the land.”66

58. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 1.3.1..
59. Id. § 2.2.
60. Id. § 2.2.3.
61. Id. § 2.10.
62. See id. § 19.01.1 (“It shall be the mission of the NCAA enforcement program to eliminate
violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should violations occur.”).
63. Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876
(1978); Cal. State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, , 88–89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Bloom v. NCAA, 93
P.3d 621, 628 (Colo. App. 2004).
64. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197–99 (1988).
65. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
66. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting Smith v. Kern Cnty. Med. Ass’n,
120 P.2d 874, 876 (1942)). But see Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256
(Ind. 1997) (“Absent fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin
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The NCAA rules-enforcement program’s mission is “to eliminate
violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should
violations occur,” while being “committed to fairness of procedures.”67 The
Committee on Infractions is responsible for administering this enforcement
program, which includes fact finding relevant to NCAA rules violations,
determination of rules violations, and imposition of appropriate sanctions.68
An NCAA member institution has the right to be given notice of any alleged
major rules violations as well as the opportunity to be heard before the
Committee on Infractions and the opportunity to appeal its findings of major
violations or penalties to the Infractions Appeals Committee.69 The
institution may be represented by counsel of its choice in both proceedings.
In all major infractions cases involving summary disposition (a cooperative
endeavor between the NCAA enforcement staff and an institution that does
not require a formal hearing that may be used only with the unanimous
consent of the NCAA’s enforcement staff, all involved individuals, and the
participating institution), the Committee on Infractions must review and
approve the agreed upon proposed fact findings, rules violations, and
sanctions, which are submitted in written form.70
Under the general law of private associations, a necessary condition of
judicial deference to the NCAA’s internal rules enforcement process as a
private legal system is that it provides an appropriate level of express or
implied contractual procedural due process (i.e., fair notice of the applicable
rules of conduct and an opportunity to be heard before disciplinary sanctions
are imposed for violations).71 Even if Penn State’s former president, vice
elsewhere, Indiana courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of voluntary membership
association. This means, inter alia, that Indiana courts will neither enforce an association’s internal
rules . . . nor second guess an association’s interpretation or application of its rules . . . .”).
67. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 19.01.1.
68. Id. §§ 19.1, 19.1.3. See generally Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame
Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2011) (discussing the NCAA’s regulatory, enforcement, and
sanctioning authority).
69. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, §§ 19.4, 19.5.
70. Id. § 32.7.
71. Indiana private association law may not provide a legal remedy if a sports governing body
does not provide contractual due process to its member institutions. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 256
(declining to recognize exception to general judicial noninterference rule for “association rules
requiring due process”). There is a potential Dormant Commerce Clause violation if state private
association laws permitting broader judicial review of NCAA disciplinary action against its member
institutions than Indiana law are applied to the NCAA, which is headquartered in Indianapolis. See
supra notes 63 and 66 and accompanying text. In Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004),
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president, athletic director, and head football coach individually and
collectively failed to act appropriately, responsibly, and ethically or violated
applicable laws by permitting Sandusky to use university athletic facilities
and to participate in university-sponsored activities as well as by not
promptly reporting Sandusky’s alleged on-campus child abuse and criminal
conduct, their conduct does not justify unilaterally imposed severe
institutional sanctions without providing Penn State with a fair opportunity
to be heard and defend itself before the NCAA Committee on Infractions,
along with the right to appeal to the Infractions Appeals Committee.
In the Consent Decree, the NCAA acknowledges that “[t]he sexual
abuse of children on a university campus by a former university official—
and even the active concealment of that abuse—while despicable, ordinarily
would not be actionable by the NCAA.”72 Nevertheless, based on the
findings of the Freeh Report, “[t]he NCAA conclude[d] that [the] evidence
present[ed] an unprecedented failure of institutional integrity . . . in which a
football program was held in higher esteem that the values of the institution,
the values of the NCAA, the values of higher education, and most
disturbingly the values of human decency.”73 This created a culture in which
“the fear of or deference to the omnipotent football program . . . enabled a
sexual predator to attract and abuse his victims,”74 which was apparently the
underlying basis of the NCAA’s decision to impose harsh disciplinary
sanctions on Penn State.
If the Executive Committee had not usurped the NCAA’s customary
disciplinary process and coerced Penn State into admitting that it violated
the NCAA rules identified in Emmert’s November 17, 2011 letter,75 the
university could have challenged the Freeh Report’s findings and the

the NCAA asserted that the application of Colorado’s private association law to resolve a studentathlete eligibility dispute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits direct state
regulation of the interstate activities of national enterprises to prevent potentially conflicting and
inconsistent state laws from inhibiting interstate commerce. Because the court rejected the
plaintiff’s claim on its merits, the court did not consider the Dormant Commerce Clause argument.
Id. at 628. See generally NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating Nevada
statute requiring “any national collegiate athletic association to provide a Nevada institution,
employee, student-athlete, or booster who is accused of a rules infraction with certain procedural due
process protections during an enforcement proceeding in which sanctions may be imposed”).
72. CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
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NCAA’s conclusions on these issues in a hearing before the Committee on
Infractions.76 The testimony of key witnesses such as Gary Shultz, Timothy
Curley, Michael McQueary,77 and possibly Gerald Sandusky (none of whom
were interviewed by Freeh Report investigators) could have been introduced
as evidence during this proceeding. In addition, other evidence, such as the
findings of the “Critique of the Freeh Report: The Rush to Injustice
Regarding Joe Paterno,”78 could have been submitted for the committee’s
consideration in determining whether Penn State violated any NCAA rules
and, if so, the appropriate disciplinary sanctions.
Despite the egregious nature of Penn State officials’ conduct and its
inconsistency with the values of the university, NCAA, and higher
education,79 it arguably does not violate any then-existing NCAA rules,
whose primary objectives are to maintain and promote academic integrity,
amateurism, and competitive balance as well as the health, safety, and
welfare of student-athletes. The NCAA does not have specific rules
providing clear notice that its member institutions may be disciplined for the
criminal80 or tortious conduct81 of athletic department employees that harms
76. The Freeh Report concluded that Sandusky’s child abuse was concealed and not reported to
authorities to avoid the consequences of bad publicity for its football program. FREEH REPORT,
supra note 4, at 14–16. Arguably, the Committee on Infractions could have reached a different
conclusion if it believed that Spanier, Shultz, Curley, and Paterno did not know that Sandusky was
committing sexual abuse of children and simply were negligent in failing to investigate or take other
appropriate steps to prevent this from occurring in Penn State facilities or in connection with its
athletics program.
77. As a graduate assistant for the Penn State football program, he witnessed Sandusky’s
February 9, 2001 sexual assault of a young boy in the shower of the university’s athletic facilities.
See Mike McQueary Takes Witness Stand, supra note 17.
78. KING & SPALDING, CRITIQUE OF THE FREEH REPORT: THE RUSH TO INJUSTICE REGARDING
JOE PATERNO, (2013), http://www.paterno.com/Resources/Docs/SOLLERS_FINAL_REPORT_2-92013.pdf.
79. At least one court has found that “‘specific and concrete’ promises contained in the NCAA
manual” are legally enforceable. Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 716 (D. Vt.
2012). Courts have held that merely general aspirational “ideals” and “goals” in documents defining
the parties’ relationship do not create a legally enforceable compliance obligation. See Ullmo ex rel.
Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671, 676–77 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] breach of contract claim will
not arise from the failure to fulfill a statement of goals or ideals.”); Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22
F.Supp. 2d 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he mere allegation of mistreatment without the
identification of a specific breached promise of obligation does not state a claim on which relief can
be granted. . . . [G]eneral promises about ethical standards” are unenforceable.).
80. The findings of the Freeh Report indicate that the failure of Penn State officials to report
Sandusky’s on-campus sexual assaults of children to the proper authorities violated the “Clery Act,”
a federal law requiring reporting and warning of crimes occurring on-campus, and Pennsylvania law
requiring the reporting of child abuse. FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 110–19.
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or endangers others on-campus, or for the failure of university administrators
to take appropriate action, including reporting to the proper authorities, if it
occurs.82 Historically, the NCAA has not disciplined universities for failing
to take effective steps to prevent the foreseeable crimes of athletic
department personnel or student-athletes that injure other students (e.g.,
recruiting a student-athlete with a past history of criminal behavior).83
The NCAA has not instituted disciplinary proceedings against
institutions for recent tortious conduct associated with their athletic
departments that results in the death of others (e.g., Notre Dame’s “serious”
Indiana Occupational Health and Safety Act violation that contributed to the
death of Declan Sullivan, a student-manager filming football practice during
high winds84), or the deliberate indifference of a university’s head football
coach to sexual assaults of women during on-campus recruiting of studentathletes.85 The NCAA does not generally discipline its member institutions
for athletic department personnel action or inaction that harms the health,

81. The Freeh Report found that Penn State’s policies and procedures did not adequately protect
children using university facilities or participating in university-sponsored activities, especially in
light of Sandusky’s known inappropriate conduct, FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 120–26, which
creates potential institutional tort liability. See, e.g., A.B. v. Staropoli, 929 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[W]here an infant plaintiffs [sic] injuries are caused by the acts of a third party,
the elements that the infant plaintiff must establish in order to prevail on a claim based on ordinary
negligence in failing to protect him or her against alleged sexual assaults are ‘(1) that defendant was
provided with actual or constructive notice that such assaults might be made upon the infant plaintiff
so as to give rise to a duty to protect him [or her], (2) that defendant was negligent in failing to take
reasonable protective measures, (3) that the infant plaintiff sustained actual injury, and (4) that
defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of that injury.’”). To date, several tort suits on behalf
of Sandusky’s victims have been filed against Penn State—in August 2013, Penn State settled
twenty-five cases with Sandusky’s victims, and other cases will reportedly be settled in the near
future. Colleen Curry, Penn State Settles 25 Suits in Jerry Sandusky Case, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26,
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/penn-state-settles-25-lawsuits-brought-jerry-sandusky/story?id=
20069117.
82. See NCAA Recommends Violation Structure: New Structure Will Adopt a Four-Levels of
Violation for Infractions, NCAA (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-0113/ncaa-recommends-violation-structure.
83. Mark Dent, Penn State to Receive NCAA Penalties Today, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
(July 23, 2012, 12:03 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/penn-state-to-receivencaa-penalties-today-645800/.
84. See, e.g., Tom Coyne, Notre Dame and Indiana Reach Settlement in Declan Sullivan’s
Death, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/01/
declan-sullivan-death-set_n_888645.html; Tom Coyne, Notre Dame ‘Collectively Responsible’ for
Declan
Sullivan’s
Death,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Apr.
18,
2011,
6:59
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/18/declan-sullivan-death-report_n_850539.html.
85. See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (10th Cir. 2007).
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safety, or welfare of student-athletes.86
As a general rule, the NCAA has not traditionally disciplined colleges
and universities for failing to comply with federal laws directly applicable to
the operation of intercollegiate athletics such as Title IX, which requires
equal athletic participation opportunities and benefits for both genders, even
if there has been an intentional violation.87
In comparison to recent cases in which the Committee on Infractions
found that other institutions failed to monitor or control their intercollegiate
athletic programs, persons whose conduct Penn State is responsible for did
not violate NCAA rules that provide clear notice of well-defined obligations
or prohibitions. In the University of Southern California88 and The Ohio
State University89 infractions cases, coaches failed to disclose known
violations of the NCAA’s amateurism rules by student-athletes. In the
Baylor University case,90 a coach deliberately concealed his payment of
impermissible benefits to student-athletes in violation of NCAA amateurism

86. Given the NCAA’s imposition of severe disciplinary sanctions on Penn State, commentators
have questioned whether the NCAA should discipline other institutions to be consistent with the
precedent it now has established:
In an ongoing investigation, several Montana football players along with another man
are accused of gang raping a fellow student. In the Montana case, head coach Robin
Pflugrad disciplined several players but didn’t report the incidents to his superiors.
Montana university president Royce Engstrom said in a statement “The University of
Montana has determined not to renew the contracts of Athletics Director Jim O’Day and
head football coach Robin Pflugrad.” Then Engstron thanked both O’Day and Pflugrad
for their service as he let them go.
The Department of Justice is investigating the university and campus police, along with
the Missoula Police Department and the Missoula County Attorney’s Office for how they
handle sexual assault allegations. For three years the Department of Justice alleges that
those listed above failed to investigate or prosecute numerous allegations of rape.
Now that the NCAA has opened the door, should they come down just as hard on
Montana as they did against Penn State?
Bryan Flynn, NCAA Has Opened Pandora’s Box Even If They Don’t Want to Admit It, JACKSON
FREE PRESS (July 23, 2012), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/weblogs/sports/2012/jul/23/ncaa-hasopened-pandoras-box-even-if-they-dont-wan/.
87. See Glenn George, Title IX and the Scholarship Dilemma, MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 273, 281
(1999); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000).
88. COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2010), available at http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/639494/20100610
_USC_Public_Report.pdf.
89. COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS
REPORT (2011), available at http://espn.go.com/photo/preview/!pdfs/111220/ohio_state_report.pdf.
90. COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT
(2005).
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rules and induced some of them to lie to university investigators as part of
this cover-up. In the University of North Carolina case,91 a university tutor
and several student-athletes violated NCAA amateurism and academic
integrity rules.
Despite having potentially meritorious breach of contract and law of
private association claims against the NCAA, Penn State’s Board of Trustees
ratified President Erickson’s entry into the consent decree, and the university
has adhered to its agreement not to legally challenge any of its terms.92
However, other parties, including the estate of Joe Paterno, have indirectly
asserted similar legal claims on Penn State’s behalf in an effort to invalidate
the NCAA’s disciplinary sanctions.93
B. Paterno Estate and Others’ Claims
Although the Consent Decree did not impose any disciplinary sanctions
on Joe Paterno, his family filed an appeal with the NCAA to invalidate the
sanctions imposed on Penn State.94 They sought a hearing before the
Infractions Appeals Committee “to redress the enormous damage done to
Penn State, the State College community, former, current and future student
and student athletes, Joe Paterno and certain others involved, as a result of
the unprecedented actions taken by the NCAA.”95 Within about two hours,
the NCAA vice president of communications responded by stating “[t]he
Penn State sanctions are not subject to appeal” because the NCAA had not

91. COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL PUBLIC
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2012), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/
pdfs/2012/university+of+north+carolina,+chapel+hill+public+infractions+report+march+12,+2012.
92. PENN STATE, FACT SHEET ON PENN STATE NCAA SANCTIONS, available at
http://progress.psu.edu/assets/content/120803_NCAA_Sanctions_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf.
93. Associated Press, Family of Joe Paterno Sues NCAA, ESPN (May 31, 2013, 1:45 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9325586/joe-paterno-family-others-penn-state-suencaa.
94. Id. By requiring Penn State to vacate all 112 football wins from 1998–2011, Paterno’s
corresponding number of victories was reduced, which deprived him of the NCAA record for most
Division I football games as a coach. Michael Klopman, Joe Paterno Wins Vacated: NCAA
Sanction Means Ex-Penn State Coach No Longer Tops Wins List, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23,
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/23/joe-paterno-wins-vacated-ncaa-sanctions-pennstate_n_1694731.html.
95. Kevin Horne, Paterno Family Files Appeal Against NCAA, ONWARD STATE (Aug. 3, 2012),
http://onwardstate.com/2012/08/03/paterno-family-files-appeal-against-ncaa/ (quoting an official
appeal letter sent to the NCAA by the Joe Paterno family challenging sanctions).
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sanctioned Penn State through its traditional enforcement process.96
Based on the “Critique of the Freeh Report” commissioned by the
Paterno family,97 Joe Paterno’s estate and family (as well as five Penn State
Board of Trustees members, four faculty members, two former coaches, and
nine former football players) filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court
against the NCAA, Emmert, and Ray on May 30, 2013.98 In their complaint,
plaintiffs allege that defendants “breached their contractual obligations and
violated their duties of good faith and fair dealing”99 by penalizing them for
Sandusky’s criminal conduct that “was not an athletics issue properly
regulated by the NCAA.”100 They also circumvented the NCAA’s rulesenforcement procedures, which “expressly protect and benefit students, staff,
and other interested parties, recognizing that fair and proper procedures are
important because the NCAA’s actions can have serious repercussions on
their lives and careers.”101 The NCAA Executive Committee had no
authority “to bypass or amend these procedures and impose discipline or
sanctions on any member institution,”102 and the signing of the Consent
Decree by Penn State’s president did not validly waive plaintiffs’ rights to
these procedures.103 Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ adoption of the
“flawed, unsubstantiated, and controversial [Freeh Report] that Defendants
knew or should have known was not the result of a thorough, reliable
investigation,”104 which was not approved by Penn State’s Board of
Trustees,105 “effectively terminate[d] the search for truth and cause[d]
Plaintiffs grave harm.”106
96. Dennis Dodd, NCAA: Paterno Family Cannot Appeal Penn State Sanctions, CBS SPORTS
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/dennis-dodd/19721445/ncaa-paternofamily-cannot-appeal-sanctions (quoting the Twitter account of Bob Williams, NCAA vice president
of communications).
97. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
98. Complaint, Paterno v. NCAA, No. 2013-2082 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas May 30, 2013),
available at http://espn.go.com/pdf/2013/0530/espn_otl_State_Complaint.pdf.
99. Id. ¶ 1. They also allege defendants “intentionally and tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs’
contractual relations, and defamed and commercially disparaged Plaintiffs.” Id.
100. Id. ¶ 4.
101. Id. ¶ 24.
102. Id. ¶ 45.
103. Id. ¶ 111.
104. Id. ¶ 5.
105. Id. ¶ 59. “Nor did they ever accept its findings or reach any conclusion about its accuracy.”
Id.
106. Id. ¶ 5.
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In summary, plaintiffs allege: “The NCAA’s unauthorized involvement
in criminal matters outside its authority and purview ha[d] prevented
interested parties from being treated fairly and ha[d] undermined the search
for truth. Instead of allowing the Freeh Report to be properly evaluated, the
NCAA ha[d] crystallized its errors and flagrantly violated its own rules.”107
In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, they seek a
“declaratory judgment that the NCAA-imposed Consent Decree was
unauthorized, unlawful, and void ab initio” and “[i]ssuance of a permanent
injunction preventing the NCAA from further enforcing the Consent Decree
or the sanctions improperly imposed therein.”108
Regardless of the substantive merits of their claims, plaintiffs must be
proper parties and have standing to assert them. None of the plaintiffs, who
collectively constitute current Penn State trustees and faculty members, as
well as former coaches and football players, have a direct contractual
relationship with the NCAA.109 Courts have generally held that only current
student-athletes whose eligibility has been adversely affected by an NCAA
ruling are third-party beneficiaries of the contractual relationship between
the NCAA and its member institutions.110 Even if plaintiffs have standing to
bring damages claims for individualized harm proximately caused by
defendants’ alleged breach of contract or tortious conduct, none of these
individuals have authorization or standing to assert any claims on behalf of
Penn State and obtain injunctive relief against enforcement of the Consent
Decree.111

107. Id. ¶ 104.
108. Id. ¶ 154.
109. See Robert Wheel, How the Joe Paterno Lawsuit Against the NCAA Is Cynical, but Tactical,
SB NATION (May 31, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/5/31/
4381644/joe-paterno-lawsuit-penn-state-ncaa.
110. See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 716 (D. Vt. 2012); Bloom v.
NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004); Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (2008). The Consent
Decree does not adversely affect the eligibility of current Penn State football players and it provides
that “any entering or returning football student-athlete will be allowed to immediately transfer and
will be eligible to immediately compete at the transfer institution, provided he is otherwise eligible.”
CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 6.
111. However, the Paterno estate may have standing to challenge the Consent Decree’s
requirement that Penn State vacate all of its football team victories from 1998–2011 because this
causes individualized harm to Joe Paterno’s reputation by precluding him from being recognized as
the coach with the most Division I football game wins. See Klopman, supra note 94.
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IV. FEDERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS
A. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Claims
On January 2, 2013, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas W. Corbett, Jr.
filed a parens patriae antitrust suit on behalf of the state’s natural citizens
against the NCAA,112 which sought to invalidate the Consent Decree’s
disciplinary sanctions against Penn State and enjoin their imposition.113 He
convened the grand jury investigation of Sandusky’s sexual child abuse in
2009, when he was Pennsylvania attorney general, and is an ex officio
member of Penn State’s Board of Trustees.114 His complaint essentially
alleges that the NCAA violated Penn State’s contractual rights and the law
of private associations, which it attempts to bootstrap into a federal antitrust
claim under section one of the Sherman Act,115 which prohibits agreements
that unreasonably restrain interstate commerce:
This suit arises out of the NCAA and its member institutions’
arbitrary and capricious application of their enforcement power for
the purpose of crippling Penn State football, thereby harming
citizens of the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] who benefit from
a successful football program at Penn State . . . .

112. Complaint, Pennsylvania v. NCAA, No. 1:13-cv-00006, 2013 WL 2450291 (M.D. Pa. June
6, 2013), 2013 WL 20316, available at http://espn.go.com/pdf/2013/espn_otl_PennGovlawsuit.pdf.
113. The filing of this lawsuit generated harsh commentary by some critics. See, e.g., Rodney K.
Smith, Column: Picking Politics and Football Over Education, USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/01/03/penn-state-ncaa-sanctions-sandusky-tomcorbett/1805189/ (“Governor Corbett, on the other hand, clings to what may be a short-term
politically correct commitment to the old win-at-all costs culture that has dominated big-time
intercollegiate athletics for too long. When rhetoric is replaced with reality, Corbett’s lawsuit is
about whether winning on the field should continue to trump educational and student welfare
concerns. This is a game the Governor deserves to lose.”); E-mail from Michael Milillo,
Schwenksville, PA, to Mark Emmert, President, NCAA (Jan. 9, 2013) (on file with author) (“The
best response to Corbett’s lawsuit is to expel Pennsylvania State University altogether from the
National Collegiate Athletic Association. By severing all ties with Penn State, the NCAA can never
again be accused by Corbett of overreaching its authority. Nor can the NCAA be accused by Schultz
of committing a criminal act. If anyone should be held responsible for allowing Penn State football
coach Jerry Sandusky to rape boys on the Penn State campus, it is Governor Corbett who refused to
prosecute Sandusky for these insidious crimes against children while Corbett was the Attorney
General.”).
114. Shelley Ross, Why Does Gov. Tom Corbett Get a Free Pass in the Penn State Scandal?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/shelley-ross/tom-corbett-pennstate_b_1093263.html.
115. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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. . . Penn State was forced to sign away its procedural rights,
including an investigation of the charges against it, factual findings
that NCAA rules were violated, a hearing before the NCAA’s
Committee on Infractions, and an appeal of any adverse ruling.
These punishments threaten to have a devastating, long-lasting, and
irreparable effect on the Commonwealth, its citizens, and its
economy.
The NCAA is a trade association of competitors, formed for the
purpose of promoting intercollegiate athletic competition, in part
through self-regulating its members to ensure fair competition on
the playing field and the protection of participating student-athletes.
While the antitrust laws permit such an association to impose and
enforce rules or standards to promote certain procompetitive
purposes, such rules must be reasonably related to those purposes,
and must be enforced through procedures designed to prevent their
arbitrary application.
The NCAA’s sanctions against Penn State fail to meet these
requirements. The NCAA has punished Penn State without citing a
single concrete NCAA rule that Penn State has broken, for conduct
that in no way compromised the NCAA’s mission of fair
competition, and with a complete disregard for the NCAA’s own
enforcement procedures. In so doing, the NCAA and its members
have forced Penn State to forfeit the valuable competitive
advantages of full participation in the NCAA.116
In Pennsylvania v. NCAA, the federal district court granted the NCAA’s
motion to dismiss this antitrust suit.117 Initially, the court observed that
“Penn State is not a party to this action and takes no position in this
litigation”118 and that “the complaint limits [its] review to the question of
whether [Governor Corbett] has articulated a violation of federal antitrust
law.”119 For section one of the Sherman Act to apply to the NCAA’s
116. Complaint, supra note , ¶¶ 2–5.
117. No. 1:13-cv-00006, 2013 WL 2450291, at *15 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2013).
118. Id. at *1.
119. Id. at *2. The court noted that the “Governor’s complaint is an impassioned indictment of
the sanctions against Penn State,” which he condemned “as ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ and
personally motivated by a new NCAA President who was out to make a name for himself at Penn
State’s expense.” Id. However, those allegations were “not the subject of the Governor’s claim for
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challenged conduct, a plaintiff “cannot allege just any harm, but must point
to harm directed at commercial activity of the type the Sherman Act is
designed to address.”120 The court ruled that this requirement is not satisfied
merely by the Governor’s allegations that the NCAA sanctions will cripple
the ability of Penn State’s football program to compete on the playing field
or reduce its ability to generate revenues for the university. Because “the
complaint is devoid of allegations that [the NCAA] sought to regulate
commercial activity or obtain any commercial advantage for itself by
imposing sanctions on Penn State,” the court held that the Governor’s
allegations “do not make out commercial activity subject to the Sherman
Act.”121
Even if the NCAA sanctions are characterized as commercial activity
and section one of the Sherman Act applies, the court ruled that the
complaint did not sufficiently allege that the NCAA sanctions are the
product of a conspiracy to achieve an anticompetitive objective and
unreasonably restrain interstate commerce.122 There was no allegation that
“Dr. Emmert, and unidentified members of the Division I Board of Directors
and Executive Committee, agreed together to punish Penn State in an effort
to achieve an unlawful purpose forbidden by the antitrust laws.”123
Determining that the rule of reason would apply, the court noted that the
Governor “bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the alleged restraint
produced an adverse anticompetitive effect within the relevant geographic
market.”124 It concluded that he failed to sufficiently allege that the Consent
Decree sanctions reduced economic competition among NCAA institutions
in the nationwide markets for post-secondary education, Division I football
players, and the sale of college-football-related apparel and memorabilia.125
The court also ruled that the Governor has no standing to assert this claim
because Pennsylvania’s natural citizens are not consumers or competitors of
NCAA institutions in any of these relevant markets and therefore did not
suffer antitrust injury.126
relief, and [were] not before the Court for a review on their merits.” Id. at *3.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id. at *8.
122. Id. at *12.
123. Id. at *9.
124. Id. at *11.
125. Id. at *14.
126. Id.
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B. Penn State’s Potential Claims
Courts have uniformly rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA
disciplinary action arising out of its traditional rules-enforcement process as
a matter of law.127 For example, in Bassett v. NCAA, a coach who was
sanctioned for NCAA amateurism and academic integrity rules violations
alleged that “many coaches, including [himself], have been unfairly
investigated or sanctioned through NCAA’s enforcement process that fails to
apply the due process protections contained in NCAA’s enforcement
process,” in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.128 The Sixth
Circuit dismissed his antitrust claim because his complaint “contain[ed] no
allegations of the effect of NCAA’s enforcement of its non-commercial rules
on the coaching market” and did not “allege the [sanction] resulted from
some anticompetitive purpose.”129 It rejected his contention that the
“NCAA’s disciplinary scheme impacts commerce because the discipline
involves financial sanctions” that effectively prohibited him from working as
a college coach for eight years.130 Observing that student-athlete amateurism
and academic eligibility rules are non-commercial in nature, the court
explained that “[a]s long as the enforcement of non-commercial rules is
reasonably and rationally related to the rules themselves, . . . enforcement is
a non-commercial activity.”131
Consistent with Bassett, the court in Pennsylvania v. NCAA held that the

127. See, e.g., Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (dismissing antitrust
challenge to sanctions imposed on coach for violating NCAA rules governing recruiting, improper
benefits to athletes, and academic fraud); McCormack v NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988)
(upholding one-year ban on institution’s participation in intercollegiate football for egregious
violations of NCAA amateurism rules); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983)
(rejecting antitrust challenge to two-year ban on university football team’s postseason and television
appearances because staff members and representatives of its football program violated NCAA
amateurism rules). See also Hairston v. Pac-10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1995)
(upholding athletic conference sanctions, including two-year bowl ban, one-year television revenue
ban, and scholarship limitations imposed on member school for player recruiting violations).
128. 528 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2008).
129. Id.; cf. Blalock v. Ladies Prof’l Golf Ass’n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(holding that the one-year suspension of a professional golfer for alleged rules violations by a
governing board solely composed of competing tour players constituted “a completely unfettered,
subjective and discretionary determination of an exclusionary sanction by a tribunal wholly
composed of competitors” for their own potential financial benefit, which infringed upon her right to
a fair disciplinary hearing in violation of federal antitrust laws).
130. Basset, 528 F.3d at 431.
131. Id. at 433.
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adverse effects of NCAA sanctions on Penn State’s ability to compete on the
football field with other universities and generate revenues does not
constitute the requisite antitrust injury caused by anticompetitive
commercial activity.132 The Seventh Circuit (whose law governs Indiana,
where the NCAA is headquartered) views the scope of the NCAA’s
commercial activity subject to antitrust scrutiny more broadly than the
Pennsylvania v. NCAA district court, applying Third Circuit law.133
Nevertheless, in Agnew v. NCAA,134 the Seventh Circuit confirmed that an
antitrust plaintiff challenging NCAA regulatory activity bears the “burden of
showing that an agreement had anticompetitive effects on a particular
market.”135 It explained: “The entire point of the Sherman Act is to protect
competition in the commercial arena; without a commercial market, the
goals of the Sherman Act have no place.”136
In order to assert a viable section one claim, Penn State would be
required to allege (and ultimately prove) that the disciplinary sanctions
imposed by the Consent Decree reduce economic competition among NCAA
member universities in a commercial market.137 This is a difficult burden to
satisfy, particularly because the Consent Decree does not prohibit Penn State
from playing regular season intercollegiate football games or appearing on
television, which are commercial markets that produce entertainment
products desired by consumers.138 Nor does it preclude Penn State from
competing with other NCAA institutions in the markets for post-secondary
education,139 Division I football players,140 or the sale of college-football132. Pennsylvania v. NCAA, No. 1:13-cv-00006, 2013 WL 2450291, at 14–15 (M.D. Pa. June 6,
2013).
133. Id. at *7 (“Contrary to the Third Circuit’s opinion in Smith, which distinguished between
non-commercial and commercial activity for the purposes of applying the Sherman Act to
Defendant’s regulatory activity, the Seventh Circuit held in Agnew that the Sherman Act ‘applies
generally’ to Defendant’s actions.”).
134. 683 F.3d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 2012). “In an area that is not obviously commercial, and thus
where the Sherman Act’s application is not clearly apparent, we believe it is incumbent on the
plaintiff to describe the rough contours of the relevant commercial market in which anticompetitive
effects may be felt . . . .” Id. at 345.
135. Id. at 337.
136. Id. (citation omitted).
137. See id. at 335.
138. See CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1.
139. It would be very difficult to prove that the Consent Decree’s sanctions, rather than Penn
State officials’ involvement in the Sandusky sexual child abuse scandal, are the proximate cause of
any reduced ability of Penn State to engage in economic competition with other NCAA schools for
students, faculty, and academic funding in the higher education market.
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related apparel and memorabilia.141 Unless its financial effects were so
severe that it prevented Penn State from fielding a college football team
(which is not the case), the $60 million fine would not reduce economic
competition between NCAA universities in any commercial market for
college football or intercollegiate athletics. Vacating Penn State’s football
wins from 1998–2011 and the university’s five-year probationary period do
not appear to restrain any commercial market. However, the four-year ban
on Penn State’s participation in post-season football games, if its team
qualifies for a bowl game, may reduce economic competition among NCAA
Division I FBS universities and restrain a commercial market.142
If Penn State could satisfy its burden of showing that the Consent
Decree is the product of an agreement among NCAA universities that has
anticompetitive market effects,143 the rule of reason would require the
NCAA to show that its disciplinary sanctions have a judicially recognized
procompetitive justification such as maintaining competitive balance,
academic integrity, or amateurism.144 It is difficult to see how these

140. The four-year football scholarship reductions do not have the requisite commercial effect if
they only adversely affect the on-field performance of Penn State’s football team in the short term.
Even if the labor market for football student-athletes is a commercial market, Agnew, 683 F.3d at
346–47, a collective reduction of sixty Penn State football scholarships during this period may have
only a de minimus anticompetitive effect. In September 2013 the NCAA announced that because of
“Penn State University’s continued progress toward ensuring athletics integrity,” it would be
restoring its lost football scholarships to enable it to award the NCAA’s annual maximum of 25
scholarships in 2015-16 and maximum of 85 total scholarships in 2016-17. Press Release, NCAA,
Executive Committee to gradually restore Penn State scholarships, available at
http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2013-09-24/executive-committee-gradually-restore-pennstate-scholarships.
141. See CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1.
142. Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004)
(NCAA rule limiting the number of times Division I universities may participate in outside certified
basketball tournaments “has some commercial impact insofar as it regulates games that constitute
sources of revenue for both the member schools and the [p]romoters.”). The common law restraint of
trade doctrine, which generally does not require pleading and proof that a relevant commercial
market is restrained, provides an alternative theory for reducing the length of Penn State’s
postseason ban if it is shown to be unreasonable in duration given the NCAA’s legitimate regulatory
objectives. For a general discussion of this legal doctrine and how it has been applied by U.S. courts
in other contexts, see generally Stephen F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law at 12–20 (Foundation
Press 1993). If the common law restraint of trade law of a state other than Indiana is applied,
potential Dormant Commerce Clause issues arise. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
143. The common law restraint of trade doctrine, which generally does not require pleading and
proof that a relevant commercial market is restrained, provides an alternative theory for potentially
challenging the length of Penn State’s postseason ban. See supra note 142.
144. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113–20 (1984); Law v. NCAA,
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sanctions relate to the preservation of amateurism or academic integrity.
However, they arguably bear a reasonable relationship to the NCAA’s
legitimate need to maintain competitive balance among its member
universities if Penn State officials’ conduct in connection with Sandusky’s
serial child abuse violated specific NCAA rules designed to achieve this
objective, or their cover-up was intended to avoid bad publicity that would
harm its football program. The NCAA also might assert that these
disciplinary sanctions have the procompetitive justification of maintaining
the integrity of and public confidence in intercollegiate athletics, which was
harmed because “the reverence for Penn State football permeated every level
of the University community” and created an “imbalance of power” with
results “antithetical to the model of intercollegiate athletics embedded in
higher education.”145
If the NCAA demonstrates that the Consent Decree has procompetitive
effects, then Penn State must prove that its disciplinary sanctions are “not
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives or that those
objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”146 It is
likely Penn State would assert that the Executive Committee’s usurpation of
the NCAA’s traditional rules-enforcement process met this standard
because, given the opportunity to defend itself, the Committee on Infractions
may have determined that its conduct did not violate NCAA rules or may
have imposed lesser sanctions if it did. If both parties satisfy their respective
burdens under the rule of reason, then the anticompetitive market effects of
the Consent Decree and its procompetitive effects “must be weighed against
each other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance,
reasonable.”147 In antitrust litigation it is always hard to predict how the fact
finder will resolve this issue.
Based on existing legal precedent, it is unlikely that Penn State could
successfully plead and prove that the NCAA’s conduct violated section one
of the Sherman Act. Its primary difficulty would be proving that the terms
of the Consent Decree have anticompetitive market effects, which is a
significant hurdle that an antitrust plaintiff must surmount in challenging
disciplinary sanctions imposed by a sports governing body.

134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
145. CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 4.
146. Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
147. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The NCAA’s historically unprecedented imposition of draconian
institutional disciplinary sanctions on Penn State for individual criminal and
tortious conduct arising out of Gerald Sandusky’s serial sexual child abuse
constitutes an unwarranted “rush to judgment” to demonstrate presidential
control of intercollegiate athletics in response to other recent scandals
involving high profile intercollegiate football programs.148 Although Penn
State “agreed” to the Consent Decree’s terms, the NCAA’s coercive means
violated the university’s contractual due process rights and the law of private
associations. The NCAA’s objectives of holding Penn State accountable for
its leaders’ failure to take appropriate action to protect the safety and welfare
of innocent children who were sexually abused on its campus and in
connection with youth activities associated with its athletic program as well
as changing the institutional culture that permitted it to occur is laudable and
should be applauded. Nevertheless, the NCAA should have respected and
followed its well-established rules-enforcement process before disciplining
Penn State. It also should adopt proactive reforms requiring greater
individual and institutional responsibility to take affirmative steps to protect
the health, safety, and welfare of all persons exposed to known or
foreseeable risks of harm by the operation of its athletics program, reforms
that provide clear notice of specific action or inaction that violates NCAA
rules and of potential sanctions.

148. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. It has spawned Congressional introduction
of the “National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act,” co-sponsored by Rep. Charles W. Dent
(R-Pa.). Among other requirements, this proposed federal legislation would prohibit universities
that receive federal funding from being a member of the NCAA unless: 1) it provides a mandated
administrative hearing, with at least one appeal, and other due process procedures deemed necessary
by the Secretary of Education; and 2) no sanctions begin until after the appeals process. Ali Fogarty,
Legislators introduce NCAA Accountability Act, STATE COLLEGE NEWS (August 2, 2013), available
at http://www.statecollege.com/news/local-news/legislators-introduce-ncaa-accountability-act-13596
66/; Jenna Johnson, Ohio, Penn. athletic scandals prompt lawmakers’ call for NCAA change,
WASHINGTON POST (August 1, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ohiopenn-athletic-scandals-prompt-lawmakers-call-for-ncaa-change/2013/08/01/aa21ef3e-facc-11e28752-b41d7ed1f685_story.html.
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